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1.1  Pre-World  War I1 Experience 
Historical perspective shows that external debt is nothing new to Brazil. 
The  accumulation  of  debt  began  shortly  after  the  proclamation  of 
independence in the  1820s. During the nineteenth century the government 
continuously borrowed abroad, mainly through the intermediation of  British 
investment banking houses. The proceeds were on the whole applied to the 
construction of  needed  public  works;  once,  however,  in  1865, debt  was 
contracted explicitly to support the war then underway with Paraguay. As an 
ever more active participant in the international economy after 1850, led by 
its  increasing exports of  coffee,  Brazil stood second only to Argentina in 
Latin America as a recipient of foreign capital in the nineteenth century. 
As a consequence, Brazil benefitted from a growing railway network which 
supported its international trade, but also was subject to variable conditions of 
external capital supply. When English capital flows to Argentina came to an 
abrupt  halt  in  1890  in  the  aftermath  of  the  Baring  crisis  and  railroad 
overinvestment, the effect spilled over to the valuation of all South American 
securities and  hence Brazilian creditworthiness.  In  the Brazilian case,  the 
much increased domestic money supply-a  product of new economic policies 
during the  first years of  the Republic-played  a more important role than 
diminished foreign investment in the massive depreciation of  the exchange 
rate  during  the  decade.  Brazil  did  not  experience  a  debt  crisis  until  the 
declining price of coffee decisively began to erode export receipts after 1895. 
Eventually,  in  1898,  it  was  necessary  to  contract  a  funding  loan  to 
capitalize prospective external interest payments for the next three years. As 
coupons on the prior debt came due, they would be redeemed by  the new 
issue.  In  addition,  amortization  on  much  of  the  debt  was  postponed for 
thirteen years. The loan, however, was conditional on domestic stabilization. 
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Finance  Minister  Joaquim  Murtinho  presided  over  a  deflationary  shock 
treatment.  Paper  currency  was  destroyed  in  proportion  to drawings on the 
funding  loan.  Government  income  was  increased  largely  through  the 
imposition of new internal consumption taxes and later through a rising gold 
quota  on  import  duties.  Adjustment  took  place  through  a  classical 
curtailment of  income, imports, and investment. ’ 
With  recovery of  the balance  of  payments,  borrowing  from  abroad  was 
renewed  during  the  next  cycle  of  international  credit  expansion  at  the 
beginning  of  the  twentieth  century.  Foreign  debt  was  now  contracted  to 
finance  Brazilian  stockpiling  of  coffee, which  took  place  in  order  to  help 
sustain  its  price.  Other  issues  were  applied  more  conventionally  to 
infrastructure projects.  So long as export earnings continued to grow, there 
was  no  problem  sustaining  increasing  debt  service.  But  by  1913,  the 
cumulative  effects  of  a  weakened  external  performance  amid  continuing 
government deficits and mounting uncertainty  about the capacity to sustain 
convertibility  made  new  arrangements  inevitable.  In  1914,  soon  after  the 
start of the First World War, a second funding loan became necessary. 
The  1920s saw  another  period  of  expansion, this  time  largely  financed 
from expanding  New  York  capital  markets  and  extensively  contracted  by 
state and local governments.  Other Latin  American countries did the same: 
between 1926 and 1928, almost one-third of all foreign bonds issued in New 
York  were  of  Latin  American  origin.  Creditworthiness  of  developing 
countries  was  aided  by  the  wartime  inflation  that  reduced  the  burden  of 
previous debt and by high commodity prices at the beginning of the decade. 
By  1929 commodity  prices  were  already  weakening.  Soon  thereafter, 
prices  collapsed and so did the capital market.  With the Great Depression, 
there were no additional capital outflows and the inevitable, and generalized, 
debt moratorium  soon followed.  Latin American  countries  were prominent 
among those declaring a moratorium.  With Bolivia leading the way, Brazil, 
Peru,  and  Uruguay  also stopped  servicing  their  debts  in  1931; they  were 
joined in the following year by Argentina (albeit only on its dollar debts) and 
by Cuba. Brazil resumed partial payments in 1934, but because of a reduced 
trade balance in 1937 it ceased service again. This default was ranked by The 
Economist  “among the most cynical that the  London market remembers.” 
Such  offense  taken  at  the  Brazilian  decision  was  exaggerated  during  a 
decade in which international obligations were more honored in the breach 
than the observance.2 
1.2  The Postwar Period 
In 1943, aided by wartime trade surpluses, Brazil rescheduled its debt on 
favorable terms, reducing the outstanding balance considerably. Bondholders 
also gained  from the subsequent appreciation in market prices  of Brazilian 
bonds. Brazil’s external debt contracted from its peak  level of U.S. $1,300 273  BrazilKhapter  1 
million  in  1931 to some $600 million in  1946. Further real reduction was 
achieved through a new bout of wartime inflation. As a result, Brazil entered 
the postwar period with a virtually clean slate. 
It was not long before new entry of capital became necessary to finance an 
ambitious  industrialization drive.  Brazil,  disappointed by  the  absence of 
expected  large  U.S. public  lending  in  the  aftermath  of  close  wartime 
collaboration, had to  turn to private sources instead. Total capital inflows, 
both from direct investment and loans, increased sharply after  1955, espe- 
cially in  the form of  medium-term suppliers credits. Inflation and external 
debt again became part of the Brazilian scene, as budget deficits increased and 
balance  of  payments  problems  became  more  severe.  President  Juscelino 
Kubitschek,  rather  than jeopardize  rapid  growth  and  his  industrialization 
Target Program, broke with  the IMF and found finance elsewhere through 
reductions  in  reserves,  short-term  swap  loans,  and  other  compensatory 
operations. At the end of 1960, the external debt stood at double its 1955 level 
and the new president, Janio Quadros, faced a serious debt and accelerating 
inflation problem. 
In an effort to resolve these financial difficulties, ties with the IMF were 
restored and more orthodox policies followed. But that effort at stabilization 
was  ended  prematurely  with  Quadros’s  resignation  in  August  1961.  To 
economic disequilibrium was  added  intense political  agitation.  Quadros’s 
successor, Jog0 Goulart, was viewed with suspicion by conservative forces 
in  society as a populist, at best,  and perhaps more radically inclined. The 
withdrawal of  the IMF mission in  1962, after the stabilization program had 
been  irreparably weakened by  the concession of  large public  sector wage 
increases, complicated access to needed new external resources. Despite the 
new funds potentially available under the aegis of the Alliance for Progress, 
the  United  States  was  increasingly reluctant  to  support  Goulart’s  reform 
efforts. Finally, as the economic situation deteriorated, a program loan was 
negotiated  with  the  United  States  in  1963,  but  the  conditions  for  its 
disbursement  were  never  fulfilled.  During  this  turbulent  period,  capital 
inflow  had  virtually  ceased.  The  World  Bank,  previously  an  important 
source of official resources for Brazil, did not authorize a single loan to the 
country between 1960 and 1964. 
When the military seized power in April  1964, inflation had mounted to 
almost 100 percent on an annual basis and housewives were protesting in the 
streets. The middle class welcomed the demise of a Goulart government that 
was both  leftist and  ineffectual. The new  government predictably found a 
more  favorable international reception.  Debt  rescheduling was  facilitated, 
and new  loans from the Agency for International Development as  well as 
new IMF credits were made available. 
Debt rescheduling and new credits did not prevent a stabilization-induced 
recession that was the result of  contractionary monetary and fiscal policies. 
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with a recovery of exports, this produced trade surpluses in 1964-66  and the 
elimination  of  arrears  and  other short-term  debts.  The supportive  interna- 
tional  environment, however,  did help  prevent  an  even steeper  decline  in 
income and allowed scope for the resumption of import growth in the early 
stages of recovery in  1967. 
1.3  Integration into World Capital Markets and the Oil Shocks 
As Brazilian growth  accelerated  after  1967, the government  consciously 
embarked on a policy of tapping private capital markets to underwrite rapid 
expansion.  Brazil was one of the first countries to respond when in the late 
1960s  the  Eurodollar  market  first  welcomed  and  then  actively  sought 
developing  countries  to  which  to  lend.  Brazil  was  also  the  developing 
country  that  relied  most  extensively  on  this  external  capital  market, 
implementing  a  debt-led  model  of  development  to  help  finance  the 
mushrooming  capital  and  intermediate  goods  imports associated  with  the 
“miracle”  of  rates of  growth averaging  close to 10 percent between  1968 
and  1973.  Another  component  of  the  strategy  was  explicit  adaptation  to 
inflation through  indexation,  not only of  wages,  rents,  and  financial  assets 
(as introduced in  1964) but also of  the exchange rate in  1968. 
When the oil shock struck in late 1973, Brazil was the largest oil importer 
among  the  developing  countries.  Already  faced  with  the  prospect  of 
weakening growth as the boom matured, the government was not inclined to 
risk  a significant  decline in real  income  from the  sudden  adverse terms of 
trade. Increased external debt was an attractive alternative. Borrowing could 
postpone  the  contractionq  effects  of  the  petroleum  “tax”  and  permit 
domestic expansion to proceed.  After  a surge of imports and  an increased 
current  account  deficit,  Brazil  opted  for  adjustment  through  an  ambitious 
program of generalized import  substitution rather than export promotion or 
domestic recession. 
An  elastic  supply of  debt  that  responded  to  Brazilian  requirements  and 
brief episodes of slowed domestic activity were adequate to keep the balance 
of payments  under control after  1973. Higher coffee and other commodity 
prices  also contributed  by  reversing  the  terms  of  trade  decline.  Brazilian 
economic  performance  after  the  oil  price  shock  remained  above its  trend 
level of growth (of 7 percent per  year), and the results evoked widespread 
admiration  for  the  success  of  the  growth-led  debt  model.  Now  growth 
requirements  determined  the  need  for  debt,  rather  than  available  capital 
permitting  higher  rates  of  growth.  Petro-dollar  recycling  apparently  had 
worked to transfer  considerable  resources  to worthy developing  countries, 
sustaining high  rates of  investment  and economic  growth. What  had  been 
only expedient to offset a disequilibrium in the world balance of payments, 
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On the eve of the second oil shock, the Brazilian debt was the largest in 
the  world.  As  such,  it  would  be  especially vulnerable to the reversal  in 
interest rates that was in the offing. Indeed, the debt had become so great 
that already in the late 1970s, before the sudden surge in interest rates, the 
reverse flow of  service payments was beginning to cancel the new inflows. 
Whereas the first  stage of  debt  accumulation saw  a large transfer of  real 
resources,  in  later stages more  and  more borrowing was going  simply to 
cover interest obligations on earlier loans.  The dynamics of  debt-led debt 
had become part of  the Brazilian story, a process that rising interest rates 
would magnify with a vengeance. 
Not  surprisingly then, in 1980, after oil prices had risen and interest rates 
were rising, Brazil was one of  the first countries to test the response of  the 
private capital market to a large debtor encountering a balance of payments 
crisis. Limited additional finance was available and only on more expensive 
terms as spreads widened. Oil producers were the favored borrowers, not oil 
importers. Well before the generalized debt crisis in  1982, Brazil was forced 
to introduce a more austere set of policies and domestic adjustment in 1981. 
For the first time in the postwar period, income declined. Brazilian discipline 
was rewarded with new  capital flows. Markets seemed able to respond  to 
debt problems with the right dosage of  conditional liquidity, and countries 
seemed able to implement the right amount of belt-tightening. 
When Mexico declared its virtual default in August  1982, Brazil,  itself 
subject to the adverse balance of  payments consequences of  sharply higher 
interest rates, replayed its earlier approach to private creditors. The Brazilian 
government insisted that their situation was distinct from that of Mexico and 
capable  of  simple  remedy.  They  claimed  that  Brazil  continued  to  be 
creditworthy owing to its own domestic policies and that it had only minimal 
need  for  new  resources.  With  a  congressional  election  in  November 
threatening the government’s control, politics precluded any official appeal 
to  the  IMF  until  after  the  votes  had  been  counted.  Then  the  inevitable 
acceptance  of  IMF  supervision  occurred,  and  Brazil  joined  the  rapidly 
lengthening queue of problem cases. But Brazil did so with the disadvantage 
of  having  its  own,  and  inadequate,  stabilization  program  on  the  table 
beforehand,  which  only  served  to  reduce  the  size  of  the  finance  made 
available. 
Brazil  was  therefore  impelled  to  a  stronger  adjustment of  its  external 
accounts.  What  differentiated  Brazil  from  other  large  Latin  American 
debtors was  a greater export  recovery in  1984. Between  1982 and  1984, 
export receipts rose by  35 percent; with  a decline in  imports of  almost 30 
percent, the current account was quickly restored to balance and the foreign 
exchange constraint became less pressing. Output in 1984 was already on the 
way  up,  led  by  industrial exports.  While the results were worse than the 
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was  smaller  than  for  other  problem  debtors.  Brazil’s  more  diversified 
industrial base allowed for both export increases and import substitution. 
In this sense, Brazilian adjustment was more successful than elsewhere. In 
another sense, it was less successful-progress  on the external account was 
not matched  internally. Successive letters of  intent under IMF programs had 
no  sooner  been  dispatched  than  they  were  made  obsolete  by  accelerating 
inflation that did violence to the monetary targets. That experience led to the 
development of new deficit concepts, adjusted for the widespread indexation 
of  government debt, which are now widely  applied to  other countries.  The 
Brazilian  experience  also  led  many,  but  not  all, to  the  understanding  that 
improvement of the balance of payments and domestic equilibrium were not 
tightly linked. Indeed, trade surpluses might themselves create new problems 
for macroeconomic policy. 
1.4  The Lingering Debt-Shock Aftermath 
A new civilian government took office in March 1985, and the rules of the 
stabilization  game  profoundly  changed.  In  the  hands  of  these  leaders, 
Brazil’s  large  export  surplus,  only  recently  established,  became  a  potent 
instrument  of  independence.  Relations  with  the  IMF  deteriorated,  and 
previous  plans for a multiyear rescheduling  agreement with the banks were 
scrapped.  Although  interest was fully paid, there  were no inflows  of  new 
capital.  Recovery  was now  based on internal demand, with limited  import 
increase.  Inflation  began  to accelerate  from  already  record  levels of  more 
than  200  percent.  Despite  strong  output  growth,  there  were  additional 
worrying  signs:  high real  interest rates and  increasing government  internal 
debt service, low investment rates and stagnant exports. Bold measures were 
called for. 
The Pluno Cruzado was implemented in February  1986 as a substitute for 
a  conventional  recession-based  strategy  of  stabilization.  The  similar 
Argentine Austral  Plan had been put into place  seven months earlier. Both 
were based upon the premise that high rates of  inflation were driven by the 
inertial,  self-replicating force of indexation.  Accordingly, the Cruzado Plan 
forced  a  sophisticated,  short-term  standstill  that  maintained  real  income 
positions  and  abolished  future  indexation.  Henceforth, inflation  would  be 
zero. In the words of the then finance minister, Dilson Funaro, Brazil would 
be a country of ‘‘Swiss inflation and Japanese growth.” For a few months it 
seemed true, and there was generalized euphoria. But signs of disequilibrium 
from  excess  demand  mounted  without  inducing  adequate  compensatory 
response.  Another  election  loomed,  and  in  the  best  Brazilian  political 
tradition, corrective actions were placed on hold. 
Indirect  tax  increases,  announced  immediately  after the election,  proved 
much  too  late and  much  too little.  Because  their immediate impact was to 
raise  prices,  they  were  ineffective.  The dam  of  controls  had  broken,  and 277  BrazilKhapter  1 
there  was  no  restoring  an  orderly  process  of  readjustment  of  prices  and 
wages.  Events  rapidly  moved  out of  control  as  inflation  rates  mounted. 
There  seemed  to be  policy  impotence.  The deterioration  in  the balance of 
payments  was  as  significant  as  the  mounting  internal  problem.  Exports 
declined  sharply  in  the  last  quarter  of  1986 as  imports  continued  their 
modest  rise,  and  the  trade  surplus  rapidly  eroded.  Suddenly,  Brazil’s 
comfortable cushion of reserves had disappeared. 
In February  1983 Brazil  declared  a moratorium  on the largest part of its 
commercial  bank  debt.  In  part,  it  was  a  strategy  intended  to  appeal  to 
internal nationalist  sentiments  and to strengthen  support for a beleaguered 
president; in part, it was (as it turned out) a misguided effort to obtain broad 
international  support and  creditor-government  intervention  in  behalf  of  a 
new  political  solution to the debt problem;  and in part, it was  a final and 
unavoidable act reflecting errors in macroeconomic policy that contributed to 
a new liquidity crisis. 
Thus  Brazil  had  come  from  being  the  epitome of  the  successful  and 
well-behaved  debtor  to  being  the  challenger  of  the  entire  debt  regime, 
unwilling  to  accept  the  burden  of  external  adjustment  at  the  expense  of 
continuing economic growth. In the end, and not very long after the event, 
Brazil  was  forced  to  yield  and  to  devise  an  alternative  strategy  that 
incorporated negotiations with the banks. There appears to be little sympathy 
in the  industrialized countries  for public  intervention  or broader  solutions. 
The  closest  anyone  has  come  to  bold  innovation  is  Citibank’s  dramatic 
upward  revision  of  loan-loss  reserves,  now  followed  by  all  other major 
banks and reaching $20 billion in total. That accounting change creates new 
possibilities  for writing down debts on the  bank  books,  but there is still a 
need  to  translate  it  into  equivalent  benefits  for the  debtor countries.  The 
Brazilian  renegotiation  in  1988 once  again  moved  the  Brazilian  debt  to 
center  stage, but  with  disappointing  results.  Not  until  the  spring  of  1989 
would  official  policy  move  to the  side  of  debt  reduction.  When  it  did, 
Mexico, and not Brazil, was the first beneficiary. 
1.5  Overview 
This capsule history  highlights  several issues that we will  analyze in the 
following chapters in more detail. 
One theme brought out by the Brazilian debt experience is the importance 
of  the political economy of the domestic response. Borrowing was frequently 
used as a conscious  policy  instrument to achieve immediate gains. That is 
the sometimes fatal attraction of debt: it holds out the prospect of something 
for nothing, at least for the time being. But the piper must be paid. Brazilian 
policymakers  incorporated  reliance  upon  external  finance  into their  adjust- 
ment strategy after  1973. When the country was unexpectedly buffeted by a 
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consequences. The vaunted Brazilian technocratic capacity more than met its 
match in the demands placed upon policy by the oil and interest rate shocks. 
Ministers did not hesitate to improvise. Authoritarian though the government 
was,  it  still  could  not  risk  the  consequences of  an  orthodox response  to 
external disequilibrium. 
Policies of debt management were  not  always optimal.  Sometimes they 
were flawed by  inappropriate assumptions and  incomplete models. Almost 
always they bowed to broader political objectives and considerations. For the 
most  part  in  this  period,  a  controlled  transition  toward  greater  civilian 
participation was an important goal. In chapter 2 we trace the origins of the 
debt strategy in the 1970s and its execution from 1973 to 1979. 
Another side of  the blend of  politics and economics was the requirements 
of  adjustment to the  changed  international environment.  In  chapter  3  we 
examine the period of  pre-IMF adjustment to the oil shock, the decision to 
seek  a  Fund  agreement  in  1982,  the  sequence  of  letters  of  intent  and 
IMF-sponsored stabilization, and the conjunction of  accelerating growth and 
inflation under the New Republic. Three essential elements emerge. One is 
the error of the heterodox initiatives adopted by the government in 1980 in a 
vain effort to sustain rapid economic growth in the face of the deteriorating 
international economy.  Second is the inadequacy of  the Fund  stabilization 
program in  its  initial  finance,  in  its  nominal  monetary  and  fiscal  targets 
inadequate  to  a  highly  inflation-indexed  economy,  and  in  the  striking 
divergence between successful achievement of trade surpluses and increasing 
domestic  disequilibrium.  Third  is  the  commitment  of  the  new  civilian 
government to  design  its  own policies  and  to  seek its  own  solutions,  of 
which the Cruzado Plan was the eventual outcome. 
The  focus  in  chapter  4  is  on  the  design  of  efficient  stabilization 
programs:  how  to  stop inflation  without  inducing large output costs.  The 
basis of the Cruzado Plan was recognition of  the central role of indexing in 
projecting price increases into the future. To  stop inflation effectively under 
such conditions requires  a  coordinated standstill of  wages  and  prices.  In 
order  to  work,  the  plan  required  the  elimination  of  other  sources  of 
inflationary  pressure,  especially  fiscal deficits.  In  the  event,  fiscal policy 
was  not  neutral  and  wage  policy  encouraged  rather  than  restrained  the 
increases in real wages that had already been  in motion as a result of  the 
1985 expansion. 
A  comparison of  the  failure  of  the  Cruzado  Plan  with  the  success in 
1964-67  in decelerating inflation suggests three lessons. One is the greater 
ease of  gaining control over the fiscal deficit when public debt is small and 
there  is  ready  foreign  aid.  The  second  is  the  excessive  boldness  of  the 
Cruzado Plan in aiming for zero inflation and abolishing indexation. While 
indexation contributes to the propagation of  inflation, it is also protection 
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of  1986 and  beginning of  1987. The  third  is  the difficulty  of  managing 
neutral disinflation. In 1964 wage compression permitted continued progress 
in reducing the rate of  inflation. In  1986 real wages were increasing at the 
expense of profit margins, helping to provoke shortages, disorderly growth, 
and the creation of black markets. 
This  central  question  of  the  relation  between  budget  deficits,  external 
finance,  and  inflation  is  the  focus  of  chapter  5.  Our  contribution  is 
twofold. The first is the clarification and measurement of  these deficits in 
an  indexed  setting.  The second is  presentation of  a  simple,  two-equation 
model  that  incorporates debt  finance  in  an  open  economy  and  specifies 
inflation  dynamics  in  response  to  excess  demand  and  indexing.  It  is 
designed  to  illuminate  the  linkage  between  the  growing  inability  to 
externally finance the public  sector deficit after  1979 and  the  acceleration 
of  inflation. 
The debt problem here is shown to be much deeper than its balance of 
payments  consequences.  The  domestic  macroeconomic  structure  is  also 
profoundly influenced by the suddenly limited access to external finance. 
In chapter 6 we turn to the trade component of  the  debt problem. The 
responsiveness of  imports and exports to devaluation is key to the relative 
weights of  expenditure reduction and expenditure switching in  adjustment. 
While  Brazilian  trade  policy  has  long  been  protectionist and  oriented  to 
import  substitution,  compensating  export  subsidies  dating  from  the  late 
1960s have  contributed to  a  rising  trend  of  industrial  and  nontraditional 
agricultural  exports.  Exchange  rate  indexation  from  1968  on,  largely 
prevented  the  extremes  of  overvaluation  that  earlier  periods  had  seen. 
Nineteen eighty was a prominent and costly exception, when Brazil dabbled 
in  ‘‘global monetarism.”  Fortunately,  the  experience was of  less duration 
than in the Southern Cone. Unfortunately, the experiment occurred just when 
the second oil shock hit; a less propitious moment for overvaluation could 
hardly have been picked. 
Brazil,  in  common  with  other  indebted  countries,  was  forced  into  a 
massive reduction of  imports after 198  1. However, Brazil achieved a large 
rise in exports in 1984 and surpluses of  more than $10 billion annually. That 
is what made continuing interest payments feasible and also led some to the 
conclusion that  foreign exchange constraints to  growth  were  no longer a 
central concern. 
Closer analysis of Brazilian import demand and export supply casts doubt 
upon that interpretation. Import elasticities in the  1980s show no  decisive 
structural break with the 1970s. Higher rates of growth thus imply more than 
proportional  increases  in  imported  inputs,  especially  of  capital  goods. 
Relative price elasticities remain low, limiting the impact of real devaluation. 
For exports, such limited response is also the rule for primary commodities, 
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favorably influenced by expansion in industrial country income. A key point 
is the influence of  capacity utilization upon both  import demand and export 
supply. Prosperity threatens to rapidly diminish large trade surpluses and to 
present the need for increased external finance. 
Chapter  7  is  both  conclusion  and  epilogue.  Our  ultimate  concern  in 
examining  the  debt  problem  is  its  effect  on  growth  and  development. 
A direct measure of the gravity  of the problem  is the continuing  low ratio 
of  capital  formation  to  total  income.  Brazilian  investment  is  inadequate 
to  support  high  rates  of  substained  growth,  let  alone  a  competitive 
capability to ensure continuing performance  in the export of manufactured 
products.  The position  of  the  public  sector  is badly  compromised  by  the 
need  to  extract  resources  from  the  private  sector  for  debt  service. 
Uncertainty  and  inflation  encourage  speculation  in  real  assets  and  in the 
black  market  and  detract  from  productive  capital  accumulation.  Highly 
variable  real  wages  provoke  strong  defensive  reactions  from  organized 
labor  eager  to protect  its  real  income  and  hence  unwilling  to  desist  from 
nominal wage demands. 
Domestic adjustment can only go so far. Real resource transfers of 4 to 5 
percent  of  product  cannot  continue  indefinitely.  That is  the  lesson  of  the 
February  1987 moratorium.  Analyses that focus on projection of the balance 
of payments miss this point. Massive trade surpluses are incompatible with 
high and sustainable rates of Brazilian growth. There are two ways out: more 
lending or reduced debt service. 
Brazil  has the capacity  to absorb  more debt productively.  One problem, 
however,  is  the  unreliable  supply  of  additional  flows.  The  Baker  Plan 
formulated in  1985 has failed to meet its minimal, and inadequate,  targets. 
The other is the great uncertainty  of  the international environment.  Starting 
from a debvexport ratio  that  is close to 5 in  1987, there is no margin  for 
error.  Brazil is vulnerable  to any and all adverse changes in interest rates, 
terms of  trade, and industrialized country growth, not to mention domestic 
policy errors. 
The case  for blending  new  flows  with  some  relief  is  given  by  market 
prices that value Brazilian debt at a considerable discount. This tells us that 
full debt  service is improbable  and that  creditors  could do just as well  by 
substituting a smaller debt with more secure payment.  There is clear scope 
for a mutual gain through effective official intermediation in the market.  It 
was only a matter of time, and of  other adverse shocks, until this mechanism 
for relief came to be accepted in the Brady Plan in 1989. Now it remains to 
be seen when Brazil will qualify. 
The basic  lesson of this  study of  Brazilian external debt is how quickly 
debt can turn from being part of  the solution to becoming a central part of 
the problem.  We may be approaching the point where it is again possible to 
unleash the productive  forces  in  Brazil  and  in  other developing  countries, 
and to turn them to making up for a lost decade of development. 